On Wednesday, March 25, 2026, Washington's political landscape was filled with reports of an imminent end to Operation "Epic Fury." House Speaker Mike Johnson told US media that the mission is on schedule and that the "final credits" of this Middle East drama are near. According to the congressman, the main objectives have been achieved, and the United States is one step away from exiting the conflict. This optimism has been stoked by Donald Trump himself, who on 23 March spoke of "important points of convergence" in secret talks with Iran. The president has painted a picture of a future deal in which Tehran permanently abandons its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a ceasefire, promising America "a world without wars."
But behind the White House's ceremonial doors, reality looks far less rosy. While Trump talks of diplomatic breakthroughs, Tehran has officially and demonstratively denied them. Instead of peace, Washington is preparing "Plan B": two US Marine Expeditionary Units have already been dispatched to the Persian Gulf, to be joined shortly by an elite parachute division. The Pentagon no longer trusts words and is preparing to force open the Strait of Hormuz — the artery Iran has successfully used since the start of the operation to block up to 20% of global oil and gas traffic. Iranian proxies have already attacked 19 commercial vessels, and US airpower, despite destroying 120 fast boats and 44 mine layers, still cannot guarantee safe passage.
The military task is complicated by the fact that in three weeks of conflict, Tehran has turned its coast into an impregnable fortress. Rocket launchers, drones and mines are safely concealed in natural caves, tunnels and coves, making them practically immune to stand?off strikes. For that reason, Washington is seriously discussing sending special forces to seize strategic islands in the Gulf. But even that is no guarantee of success: the principal problem remains mines. Intelligence estimates put Iran's mine inventory at roughly 6,000, while the newest US mine-countermeasure ships have not yet been battle?tested. Escorting tankers through the strait under a destroyer and air cover promises to be the most dangerous phase of the entire campaign, given treacherous currents and swarms of Shahed-136 drones.
While the US prepares either for an amphibious landing or for talks, Iran — through Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi — fired back: "Iran does not intend to negotiate with the United States. Messages via intermediaries are not negotiations. No negotiations with the US are taking place. Tehran has shown the world that no country can threaten its security. The US could not protect countries in the region despite its military bases. We do not want a ceasefire that allows the enemy to attack us again; we want an end to the war and reparations. Hormuz is closed only to enemies. Friendly countries, including China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan, are permitted to transit the strait. The Strait of Hormuz has become another defeat for the enemy, and we are studying special measures to manage it even after the war. The senior leadership is reviewing the proposals received."
On the diplomatic front, Iran has issued five tough conditions to end the war. The Iranian ultimatum demands not only an immediate halt to strikes and killings on its territory but also legal guarantees against future aggression and payment of reparations for wartime damage. The most painful demand for Washington is Iran's insistence on formal recognition of Iranian "authority" over the Strait of Hormuz. Foreign Minister Araghchi said Tehran will not engage the US in dialogue, calling Trump's mediated messages "empty sound." The final touch of Iran's strategy is to divide the world into "friends" and "enemies."
The Strait of Hormuz is now open only to ships from China, Russia, India, Iraq and Pakistan. Tehran is demonstrating to others that US bases in the region cannot protect anyone. Araghchi stressed that Hormuz has become another US defeat and that Iran's senior leadership is already working on "special measures to manage" the strait on a permanent basis even after hostilities end. So while Washington tries to package its exit as a victory, Iran is in effect privatizing the planet's main energy valve. By March 24, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz had been transformed from a combat zone into an area of total administrative control by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
According to Bloomberg, Tehran has implemented a semi-official vessel-verification system requiring crews to provide full documentation — from crew lists and cargo descriptions to detailed bills of lading and voyage manifests. The procedure is not yet formalized and varies case by case, but experts see it as a clear attempt by Iran to legalize its role as the region's "chief dispatcher." Some vessels, mainly tankers and LNG carriers carrying high?value cargo, are already being asked for direct payments to transit, routed through chains of intermediaries. Despite a de facto blockade, MarineTraffic recorded the passage of four vessels on March 24 — three tankers and one general cargo ship.
CNN analysts say Tehran is using selective passage as a tool of "strategic signaling," demonstrating to the world that it decides whose economies get fuel and whose do not. At the same time, vessel tracking systems are logging widespread outages and deliberate transmission of false coordinates, turning navigation in the region into a "digital fog." Official Tehran, through Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Bagayi, frames this as "security measures," stressing that countries not party to the conflict may expect transit after proper "consultations" with Iranian authorities. Against this background, Qatar, for example, has adopted a posture of pronounced neutrality and caution. Foreign Ministry spokesman Majed Al?Ansari noted a geopolitical truth: Iran has been Qatar's neighbour for millennia, and a strategy of "total destruction" is not seen as viable.
From an analytical standpoint, the conflict has entered a phase of asymmetric attrition. It is a uniquely framed duel: American resistance to financial harm versus Iran's tolerance of military damage. Importantly, these processes are not synchronised in time. Iran absorbs military strikes now and adapts to them over decades, while the US will begin to feel the real economic "transmission" of the crisis with about a six?week lag. By early April, the accumulated shortfall in oil and gas supplies will become a physical fact that cannot be hidden by financial interventions or White House statements.
The only way to close this hole in the global energy balance would be a forced, drastic reduction in consumption worldwide — a measure fraught with social risk. If Washington continues its current pattern of military pressure, the Iranian war machine may eventually break under the accumulated damage, but that process will not be smooth. Iran's collapse could be abrupt and nonlinear; until that point, the global economy will have to pass through the bottleneck of unprecedented resource shortages. At this stage, the Middle East conflict has become an exhausting, zero-sum game.
Sustained Iranian pressure on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has created a unique situation: on the one hand, regional trade traffic is effectively paralysed; on the other, the long?term production potential of the Gulf monarchies is being systematically degraded. As long as Tehran holds this lever, it retains cards capable of breaking US economic resilience faster than precision bombing can break Iranian will. In the absence of air supremacy, Iran quite literally "holds the world by the throat," using remaining missiles and drones as the only, albeit highly effective, tool to control global supply chains.
Washington's strategic logic rests on waiting for Iranian pressure to abate. Once launch intensity falls, initiative would automatically shift to the US, and the conflict could move into a controlled "mop?up" phase under total air dominance. But that scenario is a race against time. Iranian missile and drone stocks are not infinite; sooner or later, the curve of available launchers will fall toward zero. The question is whether the global economy will have already tumbled into a severe slump — perhaps comparable to the 2008 crisis — in the face of an unprecedented energy and industrial shock.
On this grim backdrop, the week brought an unexpected turn: the US and Iran suddenly moved into a format of public dialogue, even though until recently both sides had categorically denied the possibility of negotiations. Washington was first to declare the process "successful," which gave Trump a formal pretext to refrain from strikes on Iran's critical infrastructure. Twelve US points and five Iranian counter?conditions were placed on the table. The situation is complicated by a fragmented power structure in Tehran: the talks are being handled by a member of parliament who may be a potential successor to the Supreme Leader, while the IRGC's military bloc remains silent and continues combat operations. Nevertheless, the very fact of public bargaining is a powerful de?escalation signal that markets greeted with enormous relief.
While diplomats look for an interlocutor in Tehran, Saudi Arabia launched a large?scale operation to save the global oil market. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz knocked roughly 15 million barrels per day out of the system, creating shortages and a price rally. In response, Riyadh sharply increased exports from the Red Sea port of Yanbu, using the East?West pipeline. The Saudis plan to raise shipments to 5 million b/d. Although the pipeline's capacity is about 7 million b/d, a large share of that capacity serves domestic needs: refineries and desalination plants. Nevertheless, Yanbu exports doubled over two weeks to an average of 4.4 million b/d, offsetting roughly 40% of Gulf blockade losses.
However, the "logistics miracle" at Yanbu does not fully solve the problem. Monitoring shows about 56 million barrels of Saudi oil loaded at the end of February remain locked on tankers inside the Gulf, unable to transit the strait. Meanwhile, around 40 supertankers are queued at Yanbu awaiting loading. To avoid attacks, some vessels switch off automatic identification systems (AIS) in the Arabian Sea, so actual export volumes may be higher than official reports. This "invisible" oil is being directed mainly to Asia — China, India, and South Korea — while Japanese buyers are drawing on strategic stocks in Okinawa, where Aramco rents 8.2 million barrels of capacity.
For Western markets, Saudi Arabia uses a well-tested route via the SUMED pipeline in Egypt, bypassing the blocked Suez Canal. Oil pumped into the Red Sea is redirected to the Sidi Kerir terminal on the Mediterranean and distributed to clients in Europe and on North America's east coast. In this way, Riyadh is building an alternative energy reality, trying to keep the global economy afloat while Washington and Tehran conduct strange negotiations in the shadow of reciprocal missile threats.
The US economy faces its most severe test since the pandemic: import prices jumped 1.3% in March — the fastest pace since 2022. The war with Iran is pushing the country rapidly toward recession. Goldman Sachs has raised the probability of a downturn in the next 12 months to 30%, warning that the "oil fire" in the Middle East is burning consumer optimism. Their forecast shows unemployment climbing to 4.6% by the end of 2026 and inflation settling around 3%, which would hit real incomes hard and force companies to freeze hiring.
Despite the bleak forecasts, US GDP could still grow by roughly 2% in 2026. However, that growth looks highly specific: it rests on massive investments in data centers. The US AI sector has become a sort of "safe?bubble" — thanks to an abundance of cheap domestic natural gas, data centers are largely insulated from expensive imported oil. That creates a dangerous skew: the economy becomes hostage to AI investor sentiment, which supported growth last year even as job creation remained nearly non?existent.
2026 was meant to be a triumphant recovery year following Trump's tariff wars, but reality altered that script. Even if hostilities end tomorrow, the damage is done. "Consequences show up very quickly — just drive past a local petrol station," says Nancy Vanden Houten of Oxford Economics. Gasoline has shot to $4/gallon, the sharpest jump since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. That surge essentially cancels out the effect of the "One Big Beautiful Bill" — Trump's flagship tax giveaway. Early data show payouts are only about 12% higher year-on-year, well below the expected 15–25%.
The situation is made worse by long?tailed supply?chain effects. Even with diplomatic success, rebuilding Hormuz infrastructure will take months. Consumers face a second wave of shocks: a fertilizer shortage will push food prices higher, and diesel — rising faster than gasoline — will spike logistics costs across all categories. Jennifer Lee of BMO Capital Markets warns, "Even if everything is resolved today, it will take far too long to restore production." Citigroup forecasts further slowing in wage growth, which will further dampen purchasing power.
Nevertheless, Wall Street shows surprising resilience. Barclays' analysts bucked the trend and raised their S&P 500 target to 7,650 (+17%). Their logic: tech giants' profits and the AI bull driver will overpower geopolitical chaos. Morgan Stanley shares that optimism, expecting corporate earnings growth of about 20% in the next 12 months. Investors continue to believe the U.S. will remain a "safe haven" relative to other economies, although analysts concede the path back to new highs will be extremely rocky. Ultimately, the fate of the U.S. market will hinge on whether the Fed can begin cutting rates in 2026 to rescue the real economy from deep cooling.
26 March, 10:00 / Germany / GfK consumer climate index, April / prev.: -24.2 / actual: -24.7 / forecast: -26.5 / EUR/USD – up
German consumer sentiment in March 2026 showed mixed dynamics, with the GfK index at -24.7. The reading undershot market expectations due to:
Despite a modest improvement in income expectations amid easing inflation, the propensity to save has risen to record levels. Consumers are in a defensive stance, which is holding back a short-term recovery in Europe's largest economy. If April's reading comes in at the forecasted -26.5, the euro will be supported versus the dollar.
26 March, 08:00 / Japan / BOJ core CPI (main measure), February / prev.: 1.9% / actual: 1.7% / forecast: 1.6% / USD/JPY – up
Japan's BOJ core consumer price index, which strips out volatile food and energy prices and adjusts for temporary tax changes, fell to 1.7% year-on-year in January 2026 from 1.9% a month earlier. This indicator provides a view of underlying price pressure and is a key reference for the Bank of Japan's rate decisions. The slowdown reflects a gradual easing of inflationary pressure while confirming the trend toward normalising monetary conditions. If the February reading hits the 1.6% forecast, the yen would weaken against the dollar.
26 March, 15:30 / US / Initial jobless claims (weekly) / prev.: 213k / actual: 205k / forecast: 210k / USDX – down
Initial claims for unemployment benefits in the second week of March fell to 205,000, well below market expectations. Despite a slight rise in continuing claims, the overall trend of falling unemployment continuations has held since last autumn. The results underscore labour market resilience and continued low layoffs, contrasting with some weaker signals in official employment statistics. The sector remains stable even as markets track federal worker claims amid government shutdown risks. If next week's initial claims rise to the 210k forecast, the dollar index would ease.
26 March, 18:00 / US / Kansas City Fed manufacturing activity index, March / prev.: -2 / actual: 10 / forecast: 2 / USDX – down
The Kansas City Fed manufacturing index rebounded to 10 in February 2026 after a negative reading the prior month. The industrial uptick was driven by growth in durable goods production — including electrical equipment and metal goods — alongside improving hiring prospects. Moderate easing in input and finished goods prices points to further disinflationary pressure in the region's industrial sector. The composite activity index also showed positive momentum, with new orders recovering and production cycles stabilising. If the March reading falls back to the 2-point forecast, the dollar index would weaken.
27 March
27 March, 03:01 / UK / GfK Consumer Confidence, March / prev.: -16 / actual: -19 / forecast: -24 / GBP/USD – down UK consumer confidence fell to -19 in February 2026, erasing gains from the prior two months. The sharp deterioration reflects a rise in unemployment to a post?pandemic high, hitting young people hardest. Job security fears, together with weak wage growth, have materially lowered households' assessments of their finances over the year ahead. This trend risks curbing consumer activity and slowing the nascent recovery in domestic demand. If March falls to the -24 forecast, sterling will weaken.
27 March, 03:01 / UK / Motor vehicle production, January (final) / prev.: -14.3% / actual: -8.2% / forecast: 5.3% / GBP/USD – down UK motor vehicle production fell 8.2% year?on?year in January 2026. Weak demand in key markets — the EU, US and China — led exports down by more than 10%. The sharpest declines were in the commercial?vehicle segment, where output fell nearly 70% amid large-scale factory restructuring. Experts link current dynamics to the need to revise trade policy amid rising protectionism. If February production rebounds to the 5.3% forecast, sterling will weaken against the dollar.
27 March, 04:30 / China / Industrial profits, February / prev.: 0.1% / actual: 0.6% / forecast: 0.9% / Brent – up, USD/CNY – down
China's industrial profits rose 0.6% year-on-year in January 2026 — the first annual increase in four years. The recovery was driven by manufacturing and foreign-invested firms, while mining saw a sharp earnings decline. Private sector profits were stable, whereas state firms reported nearly a 4% drop. Positive dynamics in energy and utilities helped smooth structural imbalances. If February profits reach the 0.9% forecast, Brent prices will be supported, and the yuan will strengthen.
27 March, 10:00 / UK / Retail sales, February / prev.: 1.9% / actual: 4.5% / forecast: 2.1% / GBP/USD – down UK retail sales rose 4.5% year-on-year in January 2026 — the strongest annual gain in four years and well above expectations. The sharp bounce in consumer activity at the start of the year points to resilient domestic demand after a muted end to 2025. This statistic is an important indicator of economic recovery despite ongoing inflationary pressure. If February confirms the 2.1% forecast, sterling will fall.
27 March, 12:00 / Euro area / Median 12?month consumer inflation expectations, February / prev.: 2.8% / actual: 2.6% / forecast: 2.5% / EUR/USD – down Median consumer inflation expectations for the next 12 months in the euro area fell to 2.6% in January 2026, the lowest in six months, reflecting easing public concerns about price growth. Five-year expectations also eased moderately, though lower-income groups still anticipate higher inflation. The pattern across age cohorts remains closely linked, confirming a stabilising trend in expectations. If February confirms the 2.5% forecast, the euro will strengthen.
27 March, 15:30 / Canada / Wholesale trade volumes, February / prev.: 1.8% / actual: -1.0% / forecast: 0.4% / USD/CAD – down Canadian wholesale trade volumes fell 1.0% in January 2026 to CAD 85.2bn. The decline after a 1.8% gain in December was driven primarily by a sharp drop in mining and precious metals sales and weaker demand for motor vehicles and parts. Activity fell across most provinces, including Ontario and Quebec, despite modest gains in British Columbia and the food sector. If February rebounds to the 0.4% forecast, the Canadian dollar will strengthen against the US dollar.
27 March, 17:00 / US / University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment, March (final) / prev.: 56.4 / actual: 56.6 / forecast: 55.5 / USDX – down The University of Michigan consumer sentiment index fell to 55.5 in March 2026 from 56.6 in February, a three-month low driven by higher geopolitical tensions from the US-Iran conflict and a sharp rise in gasoline prices. Most demographic groups report weaker personal finance expectations amid foreign?policy uncertainty. Year-ahead inflation expectations held around 3.4%. If the final March reading matches the 55.5 forecast, the dollar index will ease.
Scheduled speeches and events (selected): 26 March, 01:15 / Australia / Speech by RBA Deputy Governor Christopher Kent / AUD/USD 26 March, 10:30 / Euro area / Speech by Patrick Montagner, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD 26 March, 12:00 / Euro area / Speech by ECB Vice-President Luis de Guindos / EUR/USD 26 March, 12:05 / Euro area / Speech by Pedro Machado, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD 26 March, 12:30 / UK / Speech by BoE Deputy Governor Sarah Breeden / GBP/USD 26 March, 19:00 / UK / Speech by Martin Taylor, BoE Financial Policy Committee / GBP/USD 26 March, 19:00 / Canada / Speech by Carolyn Rogers, Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada / USD/CAD 26 March, 19:30 / UK / Speech by Megan Greene, BoE Monetary Policy Committee / GBP/USD 26 March, 23:00 / US / Speech by Lael Brainard (Board of Governors) / USDX 27 March, 01:30 / US / Speech by Stephen Miran (Board of Governors) / USDX 27 March, 02:00 / US / Speech by Vice-Chair Philip Jefferson / USDX 27 March, 02:10 / US / Speech by Michael Barr, Fed Vice?Chair for Supervision / USDX 27 March, 10:45 / Euro area / Speech by Anneli Tuominen, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD 27 March, 11:45 / Euro area / Speech by Patrick Montagner, ECB Supervisory Board / EUR/USD 27 March, 18:30 / US / Speech by Mary Daly, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco / USDX 27 March, 19:00 / Euro area / Speech by Isabel Schnabel, ECB Board / EUR/USD 28 March, 12:00 / Euro area / Speech by Piero Cipollone, ECB Executive Board / EUR/USD
Speeches by senior central bank officials are expected to cause FX volatility as they may indicate policy intentions.
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